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1 Introduction
In this paper we explore the effects of banking regulation on financial and macroeconomic
dynamics, using the agent-based decentralized matching macroeconomic model proposed in
Riccetti et al. (2015), according to which the macroeconomy is a complex system populated
by many heterogeneous agents (households, firms and banks) which directly interact in dif-
ferent markets (goods, labor, credit, and bank deposits), and two policy makers, that is the
government and the central bank. In this context, aggregate regularities emerge from the
“bottom up” (Epstein and Axtell, 1996) as statistical properties at the meso and macro levels
that derive from individual behavioral rules and interaction mechanisms which describe the
working of markets (Tesfatsion and Judd, 2006; LeBaron and Tesfatsion, 2008). Therefore,
there are at least three main aspects that distinguish our alternative approach compared to
mainstream macroeconomics based on DSGE modeling:
• agents follow adaptive rules that can allow them to reach their purposes (consumption,
profits, etc.) in spite of their bounded rationality (Simon, 1957) and the presence of
limited and asymmetric information; this means that results could be sub-optimal, that
is agents are not able to maximize an intertemporal objective function under some
constraints. Behavioral and experimental economics support the idea that agents are
not fully rational, thus showing a tendency to behave according to relatively simple
rules under uncertain information;
• agents are heterogeneous and interact directly (that is, not only indirectly through the
price system). The interaction among a multitude of heterogeneous agents leads to
complex dynamics as emergent properties : aggregate regularities are obtained by simply
summing up individual behaviors. In such a context there is no room for the “repres-
entative agent” (Kirman, 1992). Moreover, the economy can experiment a continuous
process of disequilibrium, even if the decentralized interaction can endogenously lead
to a coordination around a “statistical equilibrium”, without exogenously imposing a
market clearing condition. However, even in situations of macroeconomic “equilibrium”,
individuals can be unsatisfied because they are not able to reach the desired choices: for
instance, a worker can be involuntary unemployed, a firm can be credit rationed and so
on. All in all, this is an alternative microfoundation of macroeconomics, based on the
idea that macro is different from micro;
• in a macroeconomic framework with heterogeneous interacting agents crisis can emerge
endogenously without the need of an external aggregate shock. Moreover, even a small
idiosyncratic shock can cause a large crisis due to network contagion. The presence of a
network is a very relevant characteristic and agent-based modeling allows us to analyze
its endogenous formation1. For instance, the bankruptcy of a firm has an impact on the
lending banks that, in turn, face non-performing loans; depending on banks’ financial
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soundness, the shock can be absorbed or it can result in banking failures with consequent
credit crunch and so on, generating a cascade effect. Therefore, as alreay explained, the
interaction can lead to aggregate non-linear complex dynamics of the economic system.
Many papers in the field of agent based computational economics have investigated the role
of interaction in a heterogeneous agents setting, exploring the properties of a methodological
alternative to neoclassical Walrasian microfoundation, based on the Representative Agent
(RA) hypothesis (for a comprehensive review, see Fagiolo and Roventini, 2009, 2012). In
Riccetti et al. (2015), a large literature review reports examples of agent-based models show-
ing emergent macroeconomic features based on the interplay between the two fundamental
characteristics, heterogeneity and interaction, of agent-based models, providing a discussion
from early contributions in the field of microsimulation (Orcutt, 1957, Bergmann, 1974, and
Eliasson, 1977).
In particular, Riccetti et al. (2015) developed a model with decentralized interactions, along
the lines already traced in the literature (for instance, Fagiolo et al., 2004, Delli Gatti et al.,
2005, 2009, 2010, Russo et al., 2007, Gaffeo et al., 2008). Nevertheless, a peculiar aspect
of the model developed in Riccetti et al. (2015) is that the decentralized matching process
presents common features across markets. This framework has many useful characteristics
among which: (i) it fulfills stock-flow consistency as many models also in the mainstream
field, (ii) it endogenously creates business cycles in which real and financial aspects interact,
(iii) it is well suited to perform computational experiments about policy interventions.
• Stock-flow consistency is a very important feature (see Godley and Lavoie, 2006) that
economists are applying also in the field of agent-based macroeconomics as, for instance,
in Cincotti et al. (2010, 2012a), Kinsella et al. (2011), Dawid et al. (2012), Seppecher
(2012).2
• The recent financial turmoil has stressed the importance of the relationship between
financial factors and the real economy on the business cycle. It means that models
should catch the possibility of firm and bank defaults (financial contagion) and the
fundamental role of leverage cycles in shaping the macroeconomic dynamics.
– As for the leverage cycle, many recent contributions try to understand the leverage
process both for firms and banks: Adrian and Shin (2008, 2009, 2010), Brun-
nermeier and Pedersen (2009), Flannery (1994), Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008),
Geanakoplos (2010), Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap and Shin (2008), He, Khang and
Krishnamurthy (2010), Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2011). Many of these papers find
that the leverage pattern for financial firms (especially investment banks and large
commercial banks) is procyclical. The behavior of the leverage level is a compon-
ent of a more general discussion on firm and bank capital structure, such as in
3
Booth et al. (2001), Diamond and Rajan (2000), Gropp and Heider (2010), Lem-
mon, Roberts and Zender (2008), Rajan and Zingales (1995). The vast majority
of agent-based models uses the “pecking order” theory (Donaldson, 1961; Myers
and Majluf, 1984) for the capital structure of firms, according to which, when in-
formation is asymmetric, investments are financed first by internal funds, then by
debt (if internal funds are not enough), and equity is a last resort. A different per-
spective on the firms’ financial structure is represented by the “trade-off” theory,
firstly proposed in a paper concerning asset substitution (Jensen and Meckling,
1976), and in a work on underinvestment (Myers, 1977). This theory is based on
the trade-off between the costs and benefits of debt and implies that firms select
a target debt-equity ratio. Indeed, Graham and Harvey (2001) conduct a survey
where 81% of firms affirm to consider a target debt ratio or range when making
their debt decisions. However, the empirical literature finds contrasting evidence to
support these (and other) theories. Then, a refined version of the trade-off theory
was proposed: the “dynamic trade-off theory”. In this theory firms actively pursue
target debt ratios even though market frictions temper the speed of adjustment:
for instance see Morellec et al. (2012) and Strebulaev and Whited (2012). In other
words, firms have long-run leverage targets, but they do not immediately reach
them, instead they adjust to the target in some periods. Dynamic trade-off seems
to be able to overcome some puzzles related to the other theories, explaining the
stylized facts emerged from the empirical analysis. Indeed, numerous papers con-
clude that it dominates alternative hypotheses: see, for instance, Hovakimian et al.
(2001), Graham and Harvey (2001), Mehotra et al. (2003), Flannery and Rangan
(2006), Frank and Goyal (2008, 2015). In this paper we use the model of Riccetti
et al. (2015), in which firms’ capital structure is based on the Dynamic Trade-Off
theory3, that is firms have a desired ratio between debt and net worth, and they try
to reach it by following an adaptive rule governing credit demand. The Dynamic
Trade-Off theory has a relevant role in influencing the leverage cycle, with a strong
impact on macroeconomic evolution. For this reason, Riccetti et al.(2015) analyze
in detail the dynamics of financial variables, firms’ leverage and banks’ exposure,
and their interplay with the business cycle.
– As for financial contagion, a firm’s bankruptcy creates losses (“bad debt”) for
banks that, in turn, have a net worth reduction that can cause a reduction of
the credit availability, with further consequences on firms. Moreover, banks could
even default in presence of a high bad debt level (especially in the case of a fragile
financial system) and this leads to depositors’ losses that reduce the aggregate
demand (and thus the firms’ profitability), besides the credit crunch. In addition,
defaulted firms and banks are replaced by new ones that need net worth as initial
endowment, which is taken by households’ wealth, therefore further reducing the
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aggregate demand.
• The last feature of the model, fundamental for this paper, is the possibility to per-
form some computational experiments about regulatory issues. In general, agent-based
models are often a useful tool for analyzing policy interventions, also considering the
interplay of coexisting regulatory rules. For instance, some recent contributions have
proposed an analysis of economic policy issues: Dawid et al. (2012) proposes a large-
scale stock-flow consistent model for economic policy analysis; Delli Gatti et al. (2005)
and Cincotti et al. (2010, 2012a) study the role of monetary policy;4 Babutsidze (2012)
analyzes the implications for monetary policy of price-setting;5 Salle et al. (2013) in-
vestigates the properties of inflation targeting; van der Hoog and Dawid (2015) explore
the formation of bubbles and the following crises along the financial cycle; Russo et al.
(2007) analyze the fiscal policy and its effect on R&D dynamics; the combination of
Keynesian management of aggregate demand and Schumpeterian policies aimed at pro-
moting technological progress is studied by Dosi et al. (2010), while Dosi et al. (2012)
consider the interplay between income distribution and economic policies; Haber (2008)
investigates the effects of fiscal and monetary policies; Neugart (2008) examines labor
market policies; Westerhoff and Dieci (2006) and Mannaro et al. (2008) analyze the
effects of introducing a Tobin-like tax; Westerhoff (2008) analyzes the role of regulatory
policies on financial markets, and Westerhoff and Franke (2012) analyze the effectiveness
of various stabilization policies; the agent-based approach has been recently extended
to the analysis of climate change policies in an evolutionary macroeconomic framework
by Rengs et al. (2015). Hence, agent-based models represent an alternative formulation
of microfoundation suited for a complex macroeconomic system; following this differ-
ent approach may have important implications for policy advice (Dawid and Neugart,
2011). For a comprehensive review, see Fagiolo and Roventini (2009, 2012). Recently,
also the debate on banking regulation was faced by agent-based models, as in Neuberger
and Rissi (2012) who find (similarly to us) that both unregulated financial systems and
overly restrictive regulations have destabilizing effects, or as in Cincotti et al. (2012b)
and in Krug et al. (2015); moreover, da Silva and Lima (2015) studies the interplay
between the interest rate setting by the central bank and financial regulation.
With the present paper we add some results to the analysis of policy issues in an agent based
macroeconomic framework. Summarizing our finding, we show that: (i) for banking stability,
the portfolio composition seems to be more relevant than the overall exposure, even if both
features are very important; (ii) an overly tight regulation is dangerous because it reduces
credit availability;6 (iii) overly loose constraints could help banks to make money and to
increase their net worth, thus making the constraints not binding, but if bank profits are
associated with a higher payout ratio (as really happened in the last 20 years), then financial
fragility increases causing a weaker economic environment (higher mean unemployment rate),
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a more volatile business cycle, and a higher probability of triggering crises. These results are
related to more general findings that stress two difficulties in determining the “right” policy
intervention: (i) a non-linear relationship between the health of the economy and regulation;
(ii) the interaction of regulatory rules among themselves and with agents’ behavior. Many
different models underestimate these complexities. In particular, about the first issue (that is
the non-linear relationships between the health of the economy and the regulation), before the
“subprime/Lehman Brothers” financial crisis, most of the researchers support the idea that
a more developed financial system is associated with a higher growth rate (see, for instance,
Levine, 2005). These papers sometimes argue for a favorable view of the liberalization process
as well as the regulatory easing that involved the financial sector (for instance, Aghion at al.,
2010, state: “tighter credit constraints also induce procyclicality in the growth rate of the
economy”, “they also reduce the mean growth rate of the economy”, “these results mean that
financial frictions contribute to both lower mean growth and higher volatility”), and of the
globalization process (see, for instance, Kose at al., 2009). However, after the last financial
crisis and the sovereign debt crisis, many authors challenge this idea: some authors stress
the trade-off between growth and stability, others show that a stable financial system can
even have a positive impact on growth (Sinha, 2012)7. Moreover, some papers highlight the
presence of non-linear relationships, supporting the findings of our research. Indeed, Cecchetti
and Kharroubi (2012) find that “the level of financial development is good only up to a point,
after which it becomes a drag on growth” and, above all, the Global Financial Stability Report
published by the International Monetary Fund in October 2012, using a Panel Estimation with
Quadratic Term over the period 1998-2010, shows the non-linear relationship between financial
regulation and economic outcomes, stating at page 161 that: “Some features that improve the
resilience of a financial system can adversely interact with economic outcomes once they exceed
a certain threshold. Capital and liquidity buffers are a case in point. While these financial
buffers generally tend to help economic outcomes, the analysis found that beyond certain
(fairly high) levels in low-income and emerging market economies, they may be associated
with lower economic growth, higher volatility of economic growth, and higher financial stress.
This result is generally in line with findings of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(BCBS, 2010) on the diminishing benefits of buffers. A similar result has also been found
in other studies for the influence of credit-to-GDP ratio on economic volatility”. Therefore,
the Global Financial Stability Report suggests, as policy implication, the usefulness of Basel
III reforms, but if the thresholds do not exceed certain levels. Regarding the second issue
above mentioned, a very few papers highlight the importance of considering the interaction
effects among rules and banks’ behaviour: Vives (2014) shows that optimal levels of capital
and liquidity requirements are not independent among themselves, as well as with respect
to both the level of disclosure in the market and the level of competition that banks face.
The working paper n.28 of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (January 2015)
underlines the importance of the interplay among accounting rules, prudential regulation
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and bank behavior, showing that the interaction between prudential filters and accounting
standards “may generate behavioural responses that warrant further research”.
The methodology used to address the financial regulation issue is to perform two sensit-
ivity analyses on two parameters of the model of Riccetti et al. (2015), that constrain the
banking activity: the overall credit exposure and the lending concentration towards a single
counterpart. Moreover, we analyze what happens if both parameters are changed jointly,
calling this case the “deregulation” one. We slightly modify the cited agent-based model to
allow banks to extend a higher dividend, to address the fact that, in the last decades, the
financial sector obtains a deregulation process coupled with a growing payout policy. For a
brief literature review and discussion on the payout policy, see Subsection 4.3.
With our finding we try to give a contribution to the discussion on the Basel III reforms of
the banking sector. Indeed, the overall credit exposure is related to the First Pillar of the
reform on Capital requirements, in which there are many rules concerning this topic. We now
report the ones that are more directly related with our paper:
• the common equity has to be larger than the 4.5% of risk-weighted assets;
• besides the already mentioned 4.5%, there is an additional 2.5% of equity (for an overall
value of 7%) called Capital Conservation Buffer ; constraints on a bank’s payout and
other discretionary distributions are imposed if the common equity falls below this 7%;
• a maximum for the non-risk-based Leverage Ratio (including off-balance sheet expos-
ures) is set in order to avoid overly large leverage ratio based on risk-based measures.
The equity has to be above 3% of total assets value (thus bank’s leverage ratio has to
be below about 33).
In particular, the Capital Conservation Buffer is also related to our discussion on the payout
policy. About the possible implications related to the introduction of the Leverage Ratio see,
for instance, Elliott (2009, 2010), Hellwig (2010), Kiema e Jokivuolle (2010).
Instead, the analysis on the lending concentration parameter is associated with the debate on
the Second Pillar, about “Risk management and supervision”, which also contains the topic
of managing risk concentrations.
In general, in recent years, numerous studies have analyzed in detail the various regulatory
reforms (or reform proposals) and their impacts both on the economy and on profitability
and management of banks, deriving from the strengthening of capital requirements (Jokipii
and Milne, 2008; Hanson et al., 2010; King, 2010; Al-Darwish et al., 2011; Carlson et al.,
2011; Gambacorta, 2011; Agenor and Pereira da Silva, 2012; Allen et al., 2012; Francis and
Osborne, 2012; Mora and Logan, 2012; Tutino et al., 2012; Vollmer and Wiese, 2013; Zhou,
2013).8 However, as already said, an important aspect of our contribution is based on the use
of the agent-based methodology that allows us to simulate the joint impact of more than a
single regulatory rule on macroeconomic performance and financial stability.
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Obviously, our contribution is in any case restricted to some aspects of the Basel III reform,
given that this reform concerns a much larger number of aspects, such as the liquidity regula-
tion, the regulation of systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), the pro-cyclicality
of the capital requirements (with the Countercyclical buffer) and so on (for a clear summary
table of the whole Basel III reforms, see: www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3/b3summarytable.pdf).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model setup and, in particu-
lar, Subsection 2.1 reports the characteristics of the four markets (credit, labor, goods, and
bank deposits) which composes our economy; the evolution of agents’ wealth is described in
subsection 2.2, while the behavior of policy makers is discussed in subsection 2.3. Section 3
summarizes the model’s dynamics and the simulation results found in the baseline setting of
the model reported in Riccetti et al. (2015). We provide the regulatory analyses in Section 4,
in which we perform sensitivity and Monte Carlo experiments, comparing these findings with
the baseline model outputs and highlighting the implications for financial regulation. Section
5 concludes.
2 The model
This paper, as already explained, is based on the model reported in Riccetti et al. (2015).
Our economy evolves over a time span t = 1, 2, ..., T and is composed by households (h =
1, 2, ..., H), firms (f = 1, 2, ..., F ), banks (b = 1, 2, ..., B), a central bank, and the government.
Agents are boundedly rational and live in an incomplete and asymmetric information context,
thus they follow simple rules of behavior and use adaptive expectations.
Agents interact in four markets: (i) credit market; (ii) labor market; (iii) goods market; (iv)
deposit market. The interaction between the demand (firms in the credit and labor markets,
households in the goods market, and banks in the deposit market) and the supply (banks
in the credit market, households in the labor and deposit markets, and firms in the goods
market) sides of the four markets follows a common decentralized matching protocol, even if
each agent in the demand side observes a list of potential counterparts in the supply side and
chooses the most suitable partner according to some market-specific criteria. In particular,
interaction develops in the following way: a random list of agents in the demand side is set,
then the first agent in the list observes a random subset of potential partners, whose size
depends on a parameter 0 < χ ≤ 1 (which proxies the degree of imperfect information), and
chooses the cheapest one. After that, the second agent on the list performs the same activity
on a new random subset of the updated potential partner list. The process iterates till the
end of the demand side list. Subsequently, a new random list of agents in the demand side is
set and the whole matching mechanism continues until either one side of the market (demand
or supply) is empty or no further matchings are feasible because the highest bid (for example,
the money till available to the richest firm) is lower than the lowest ask (for example, the
lowest wage asked by till unemployed workers).
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The sequence of events which occurs in the different markets is fully described in Appendix
A.
Now, we briefly explain the main features of the four markets. However, for a detailed
description of agents’ behavioral rules, see Appendix B.
2.1 Markets
2.1.1 Credit market
In each period, firms and banks at first interact in the credit market. Firm’s f credit demand
at time t depends on its net worth Aft and the leverage target lft. Hence, required credit is:
Bdft = Aft · lft (1)
The evolution of the leverage target changes according to expected profits and inventories:
if expected profits are above expected interest rate and there are few inventories, the firm
enlarges its target leverage, and vice versa (for details, see Equation 10 in Appendix B).
Banks set their credit supply Bdbt depending on their net worth Abt, deposits Dbt, and
the quantity of money provided by the central bank mbt. However, we add some regulatory
constraints:
Bdbt = min(kˆbt, k¯bt) (2)
where kˆbt = γ1 · Abt, k¯bt = γ2 · Abt + Dbt−1 + mbt, with parameters γ1 > 1 and 0 ≤ γ2 ≤
1. Parameter γ1 represents the maximum exposure in risky assets (corporate lending) as a
multiple of bank capital. Instead, parameter γ2 represents the maximum percentage of capital
that can be invested, therefore k¯bt constraints the bank to lend no more than the sum of its
deposits, the money received by the central bank and a part of its equity9.
Moreover, in order to reduce risk concentration, only a fraction 0 < β ≤ 1 of the total amount
of the credit Bdbt can be lent to a single firm.
Bank b charges an interest rate on the firm f at time t according to the following equation:
ibft = iCB + iˆbt + i¯ft (3)
where iCB is the nominal interest rate set by the central bank, iˆbt is a bank-specific component
(see Equation 11 in Appendix B), and i¯ft = ρ
lft/100 is a firm-specific component, that is a
risk premium on firm target leverage lft (with parameter ρ > 0).
The bank-specific component decreases if the bank did not manage to lend all the credit
supply to firms and increases in the opposite case (for details, see Equation 11 in Appendix
B). Indeed, at the end of the interaction mechanism, each firm ends up with a credit Bft ≤ Bdft
and each bank lends firms an amount Bbt ≤ Bdbt. The difference between desired and effective
credit is equal to Bdft −Bft = Bˆft and Bdbt −Bbt = Bˆbt, for firms and banks respectively.
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Moreover, we hypothesize that banks ask for an investment in risk free government secur-
ities equal to PDdbt = k¯bt − Bbt. Given our simplifying setting, this allows banks to recover
the cost of the interests paid on deposits and central bank money that banks do not lend.
If the sum of desired government bonds exceeds the amount of outstanding public debt then
the effective investment PDbt is proportionally rescaled. Instead, if public debt exceeds the
banks’ desired amount, then the central bank buys the difference.
2.1.2 Labor market
Government, firms and households interact in the labor market. On the demand side, first
of all, the government hires a fraction g of households. The remaining part is available for
working in the firms. Firm’s f labor demand depends on available funds, that is net worth
and bank credit: Aft + Bft. In other words, for instance a firm that realized high profits
at time t − 1 is very likely to enlarge both its net worth (with reinvested profits) and its
banks’ credit (higher leverage as explained in the previous subsection) in order to expand its
production, hiring a larger number of workers.
On the supply side each worker posts a wage wht which increases if he/she was employed in
the previous period and vice versa. Moreover, the required wage has a minimum related to
the price of a good (for details, see Equation 12 in Appendix B).
As a result of the decentralized matching between labor supply and demand, each firm ends
up with a number of workers nft and a residual cash (insufficient to hire an additional worker)
and a fraction of households may remain unemployed. The wage of unemployed people is set
equal to zero.
2.1.3 Goods market
Subsequently, households and firms interact in the goods market. On the demand side,
households set the desired consumption on the basis of their disposable income and wealth
(for details, see Equation 13 in Appendix B).
Firms produce consumption goods on the basis of hired workers as follows:
yft = φ · nft (4)
where φ ≥ 1 is a productivity parameter. They put in the goods market their current period
production and previous period inventories yˆft−1. The selling price increases if in the previous
period the firm managed to sell all the output, while it reduces if it had positive inventories.
Moreover, the minimum price at which the firm wants to sell its output is set so that it is at
least equal to the average cost of production, that is ex-ante profits are at worst equal to zero
(for details, see Equation 14 in Appendix B).
As a consequence of the interaction between the supply and demand sides in the goods market,
each household ends up with residual cash, which is not enough to buy an additional good
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and which it will try to deposit in a bank. At the same time, firms may remain with unsold
goods (inventories), that they will try to sell in the next period.
2.1.4 Deposit market
Banks and households interact in the deposit market. Banks represent the demand side and
households are on the supply side. Banks offer an interest rate on deposits according to
their funds’ requirement: if a bank exhausts the credit supply by lending to private firms or
government then it decides to increase the interest rate paid on deposits, so as to attract new
depositors, and vice versa. However, the interest rate on deposits has an upper bound given
by the policy rate iCB; this represents both the rate at which banks could refinance from the
central bank and the rate paid by the government on public bonds (for details, see Equation
15 in Appendix B).
Households determine their savings to be deposited in banks as the desired savings plus the
residual cash at the end of the interaction in the consumption market. Moreover, they set
the minimum interest rate they want to obtain on bank deposits as follows: a household that
in the previous period found a bank paying an interest rate higher or equal to the desired
one decides to ask for a higher remuneration. In the opposite case, it did not find a bank
satisfying its requirements, thus it kept its money in cash and now asks for a lower rate for
details, see Equation 16 in Appendix B). We hypothesize that a household deposits all the
available money in a single bank that offers an adequate interest rate.
2.2 Profits, dividends and wealth dynamics
2.2.1 Firms
At the end of the interaction in the credit, labor and goods markets, every firm f calculates
its profit/loss:
pift = pft · y¯ft −Wft − Ift (5)
where pft is the price set by the firm f on its goods, y¯ft are the sold goods, Wft is the
sum of wages paid to employed workers, and Ift is the sum of interests paid on bank loans.
Firms pay a proportional tax τ on positive profits; however, firms can subtract previous
negative profits in the calculation of the tax base. After taxes, we indicate net profits with
p¯ift.
Finally, firms pay a percentage δft as dividends on positive net profits. The fraction 0 ≤ δft ≤
1 goes down if in the previous period the firm produces and sells all the goods (no inventories),
then wants to retain a larger share of profits to enlarge production, and vice versa.
Thus, the evolution of firm f ’s net worth is given by the previous period net worth plus profit
net of taxes and dividends.
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If Aft ≤ 0 then the firm goes bankrupt and a new entrant replaces the bankrupted agent
according to a one-to-one replacement. Banks linked to defaulted firms lose a fraction of their
loans, but recover the remaining part; analytically, (Aft +Bft)/Bft is the recovery rate.
The new entrant starts with an initial net worth equal to a multiple of the average goods
price and the money needed to finance entrants is subtracted from households’ wealth. We
set to one the leverage of the new firm. Moreover, the entrant sets an initial price for its
goods equal to the mean price of survival firms.
2.2.2 Banks
As a result of interaction in the credit and the deposit markets, the bank b’s profit is equal
to:
pibt = intbt + i
Γ
t · Γbt − iDbt−1 ·Dbt−1 − iCB ·mbt − badbt (6)
where intbt represents the interests gained by bank b on lending to non-defaulted firms, i
Γ
t
is the interest rate on government securities Γbt, i
D
bt−1 is the interest rate paid on the sum
of deposits Dbt−1, iCB is the interest rate paid on the amount of money mbt required to the
Central Bank, and badbt is the amount of “bad debt” due to bankrupted firms. Bad debt is
the loss given default of the loans to bankrupted firms, that is a fraction 1 less the recovery
rate (see the previous subsection) of the loans.
Banks pay a proportional tax τ on positive profits; however, they subtract previous negative
profits in the calculation of the tax base. We indicate net profits with p¯ibt.
Finally, banks pay a percentage δˆbt as dividends on positive net profits. The fraction 0 ≤
δˆbt ≤ 1 evolves according to the following rule, which is different from the one used in Riccetti
et al. (2015), because here we add the parameter 0 ≤ δ¯b ≤ 1:
δˆbt = δ¯b + δbt (7)
where:
δbt =
8
<
:
δbt−1 · (1− α · U(0, 1)) , if Bbt > 0 and Bˆbt = 0
δbt−1 · (1 + α · U(0, 1)) , if Bbt = 0 or Bˆbt > 0
(8)
That is, if the bank does not manage to lend the desired supply of credit then it decides to
distribute more dividends (because it does not need high reinvested profits), and vice versa.
Thus, the evolution of bank b’s net worth is given by the previous period net worth plus
profit net of taxes and dividends.
If Abt ≤ 0 then the bank is in default and a new entrant takes its place. Households linked
to defaulted banks lose a fraction of their deposits (the loss given default rate is calculated
as 1− (Abt +Dbt)/Dbt). The initial net worth of the new entrant is a multiple of the average
goods price. Moreover, the initial bank-specific component of the interest rate (ˆibt) is equal
to the mean value across banks.
12
2.2.3 Households
According to the operations in the labor, goods, and deposit markets, the household h’s
wealth evolves as follows:
Aht = (1− τ ′) · [Aht−1 + (1− τ) · wht + divht + intDht − cht] (9)
where τ ′ is the tax rate on wealth (applied only on wealth exceeding a threshold τ¯ ′ · p¯,
which is a multiple of the average goods price), τ is the tax rate on income, wht is the wage
gained by employed workers, divht is the fraction (proportional to the household h’s wealth
compared to overall households’ wealth) of dividends distributed by firms and banks net of
the amount of resources needed to finance new entrants (hence, this value may be negative),
intDht represents interests on deposits, and cht is the effective consumption. Households linked
to defaulted banks lose a fraction of their deposits as already explained.
2.3 Government and central bank
Government’s current expenditure is given by the sum of wages paid to public workers (Gt)
and the interests paid on public debt to banks. Moreover, government collects taxes on
incomes and wealth and receives interests gained by the central bank. The difference between
expenditures and revenues is the public deficit Ψt. Consequently, public debt is Γt = Γt−1+Ψt.
The presence of the government as an acyclical sector is a very important feature of the model.
Indeed, hiring public workers, the government provides a fraction of the aggregate demand.
In this way it partially stabilizes the economy by reducing output volatility.
Central bank decides the policy rate iCB and the quantity of money to put into the
system in accordance with the interest rate10. In order to do that, the central bank observes
the aggregate excess supply or demand in the credit market and sets an amount of money Mt
to reduce the gap in the subsequent period of time.
3 Baseline model results
We explore the dynamics of the model by means of computer simulations. The parameter
setting is reported in Table 2 which is in Appendix C. With this setting we perform two Monte
Carlo analyses with two different time spans. The first analysis exploits 1000 Monte Carlo
simulations over a “short” time horizon of 150 periods, of which we examine the results for
the last 50, because the first 100 periods are used to initialize the model. The second study
regards 100 Monte Carlo simulations over a “long” time span of 500 periods (again, the first
100 are used to initialize the model). However, this model analyzes the business cycle, then
it performs a short/medium run analysis, given that we do not consider the features that
characterize the long run growth (tied to the productivity of both capital and labor). So, the
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“long” time horizon simulation is only another way to assess the business cycle fluctuations,
able to show some additional features of the computational model.
In 995 out of 1000 of the “short” simulations and in 98 out of 100 of the “long” Monte Carlo
simulations, we observe the emergence of endogenous business cycles with the following pat-
tern: an increase of firms’ profits determines an expansion of production and, if banks extend
the required credit, this effect could be amplified resulting in more employment; the fall of
the unemployment rate increases wage inflation that, on the one hand, expands the aggreg-
ate demand, while on the other hand reduces firms’ profits, possibly causing the inversion
of the business cycle. Then, we can notice that the engine of the economy is given by the
dynamic relationship between unemployment and profit rate, enlarged by a financial acceler-
ator mechanism. The “real” mechanism is that an increase of profits boosts the expansion of
the economy and then a fall of the unemployment rate follows; low unemployment increases
wages, so firms try to save on production costs reducing labor demand. This results in a rise of
unemployment that lowers the profit rate in the subsequent period due to a lack of aggregate
demand. However, the presence of unemployed people decreases wages and this makes firms
hire a larger number of workers, thus boosting the beginning of a new expansionary phase of
the business cycle.
Firms’ leverage and banks’ exposure are the financial drivers that enlarge business fluctu-
ations: growing firms ask for more credit to expand the production; subsequently, low un-
employment fosters wages that, together with the rise of interest payments on the increased
debt, reduces firms’ profitability. Thus, the business cycle reverses and financial factors amp-
lify the recession, indeed the relatively low level of profits with respect to interest payments
induces a deleveraging process. According to empirical evidence (for example, Kalemli-Ozcan
et al., 2011), there is a negative but modest correlation between firms’ leverage and the unem-
ployment rate, while there is a more significant negative correlation between banks’ exposure
and unemployment. The importance of banks’ capitalization is evident because this vari-
able determines the credit conditions, thus influencing firms’ leverage and the macroeconomic
evolution.
Focusing on the financial sector, the model shows that a more leveraged financial sector sus-
tains the expansion of the economy, but the relationship is non-linear: for low levels, an
increase of bank exposure reduces the rate of unemployment; instead, for high levels of bank
exposure a further increase makes unemployment higher. In other words, if banks increase
their exposure enlarging credit to firms, the latter hire more workers and the unemployment
rate decreases. But, when the exposure of banks becomes “excessive” this leads to instability
(more failures) and an increase of the unemployment rate follows.
Business fluctuations are mitigated by the government, representing an acyclical sector,
that plays a central role in reducing the output volatility through stabilizing the aggregate
demand. However, in 5 out of 1000 “short” simulations and in 2 out of 100 “long” ones,
the system is characterized by large and extended crises, that is the average unemployment
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rate reaches values above 20%. Differently from the usual business cycle mechanism, wage
reduction due to growing unemployment does not reverse the cycle, but generates a lack
of aggregate demand that amplifies the recession in a vicious circle for which the fall of
purchasing power prevents firms from selling commodities, then firms decrease production,
unemployment continues to rise, and the recession further deteriorates.
For details on the average values of macroeconomic variables analyzed in the Monte Carlo
simulations, see Table 3 in Appendix C.
4 Regulation analysis
In this section we perform some computational experiments to assess the effects of modifying
the regulatory constraints on bank activities. For this analysis, we change the parameters γ1
and β (see Section 2.1.1).Thus, we try to address in a stylized way some banking regulation
topics. Indeed, we can only implement some aspects of the Basel III proposals in this simplified
framework given that, for instance, banks do not use various instruments (that is, on the asset
side they only lend to firms and residually to the government, while on the passive side they
only have equity and deposits) and there are no different lending and borrowing horizons in
order to assess liquidity vs. solvency problems. However, as already explained in Section 1,
studying the role of parameter γ1 we can analyze the banking capital and leverage regulation,
given that this parameter constrains the risky assets over the bank’s net worth11. Instead,
studying parameter β we can address the maximum lending concentration issue, which is
included in the Second Pillar (“Risk management and supervision”) of Basel III Capital
regulation.
In the baseline model we set γ1 = 10 and β = 0.1. We now discuss the experimental set-
tings of the additional analyses we propose; then, we will report the results in the Subsections
below.
The first analysis is on parameter β.12 In particular, we perform 1000 replications of the
model over a time span of T=150 organized as follows: 20 simulations for each value of β
from 1% to 50% with step 1%, keeping all the other parameters unchanged. Then, we analyze
the impact of parameter β over the “long” time horizon. That is, we run 100 Monte Carlo
repetitions with T=500 for β = 0.50, in order to compare these results with those emerging
from the 100 simulations of the baseline model over the “long” time span.
The second analysis is on parameter γ1. As in the previous case, we perform both a sensitivity
analysis over a time span of T=150 changing γ1 from 1 to 50 with 50 steps of 1 (again, for
each step we perform 20 simulations for an overall amount of 1000 simulations) and a study
with 100 Monte Carlo repetitions on the “long” time span T=500 with γ1=50.
The third analysis concerns both parameters at the same time, that is we study a parameter
setting with γ1 = 50 and β = 0.5 with 100 Monte Carlo simulations on the “long” time
horizon T=500. In this way we assess a case of wide financial “deregulation”.
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Last, we perform two batteries of 100 Monte Carlo repetitions where δ¯b=0.45, and the other
parameters are set either as in the baseline model setting (γ1 = 10 and β = 0.1) or as in
the “deregulation” case (γ1 = 50 and β = 0.5); this analysis is performed over the “long”
horizon. In this way we analyze the “deregulation” case in a high payout ratio environment.
The discussion on banking payout is strictly related with the Basel III Capital Conservation
Buffer, because a constraint on banks discretionary distributions is imposed if the common
equity falls below this threshold.
The statistics regarding the unemployment rate and its volatility in the various scenarios, with
T = 500, are reported in Table 1. For additional statistics regarding other central variables,
see Table 4 and 5 in Appendix D.
4.1 Sensitivity analysis on parameter β
We perform the sensitivity analysis on parameter β that constrains the maximum lending
concentration. Firstly, as already said, we run 1000 simulations on the “short” time horizon
for 50 different values of β, from 0.01 to 0.50 with 0.01 step.
Figure 1 shows that when β is very small, that is if banking regulation is excessively
tight, there is a relevant credit rationing which causes many firm defaults and high rates of
unemployment, even though banks are safe and their default is very unlikely. As the parameter
grows, while remaining low, the credit mismatch reduces or disappears, followed by a reduction
of firm defaults and unemployment. Further increasing β, the riskiness of the financial system
tends to rise, as shown by the growing number of bank defaults. This induces at first a slight
increase of the mean rate of unemployment. Then, when the regulatory constraint becomes too
loose, system’s financial fragility is excessive and this can lead to large bankruptcy avalanches
of firms and banks. As a consequence, banks’ net worth collapses resulting in a strong credit
constraint. At the same time, firms are not able to hire workers because their net worth also
decreases and they do not receive enough credit from the banking system. Hence, the credit
crunch results in a large unemployment rate. Moreover, this determines high unemployment
volatility and a growing number of large crises (average unemployment rate above 20%): for
instance, when β = 0.05 the mean unemployment rate is 8.7% and there are no large crises,
while if β = 0.50 it becomes 18.73% with a large crisis scenario in 6 out of 20 simulations13.
To further check for the robustness of these results and for the presence of large crises, we
repeat the Monte Carlo simulations over a “long” time horizon T=500 (as usual, excluding
from the analysis the first 100 time steps used to initialize the economy). We compare the
findings obtained when β = 0.5, with those of the baseline case, that is β = 0.1 (see Table
1). If β = 0.5, we observe 22 out of 100 simulations with large crises, a much higher number
than the 2 simulations when β = 0.1. Moreover, if we consider all simulations in which
the unemployment rate exceeds 20% for at least one period, we calculate 36 cases when
β = 0.5 versus the 3 cases when β = 0.1. The riskiness of this setting is confirmed by the
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Figure 1: Sensitivity analysis on the impact of the parameter β – from 0.01 to 0.50 with step
0.01 – on the following variables: (i) unemployment rate, (ii) firms default rate, (iii) banks
default rate, (iv) credit mismatch (that is the difference between the money available from
banks and not lent and the money required by firms and not received). All values are the
average on the 20 simulations with the corresponding β value.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.50.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
unemployment rate
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.50.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
firm defaults
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.50
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
bank defaults
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5−2500
−2000
−1500
−1000
−500
0
500
credit mismatch
17
fact that, even focusing on the simulations in which the average unemployment rate is below
20%, the mean unemployment rate is greater (10.61% vs 9.73%, statistically different at 1%
level) and the unemployment volatility is higher (1.99% vs 1.84%, statistically different at 1%
level). In other words, compared to the baseline setting, the main difference when β = 0.5
is the significantly higher frequency of large and extended crises; moreover, the level and the
volatility of the unemployment rate is a bit higher even if we discard the large crisis cases
(and this is also one of the reasons for which large crises are more probable).
4.2 Sensitivity analysis on parameter γ1
Now we study parameter γ1 that represents the maximum bank exposure in risky assets
(corporate lending) as a multiple of bank capital. As in the previous Section, we run 1000
simulations on the “short” time horizon for 50 different values of γ1, from 1 to 50 with step
of 1. With 1 ≤ γ1 ≤ 3, firms face a huge credit constraint that causes a very high number of
firm defaults. A high unemployment rate follows. Instead, differently from the analysis on β,
we do not detect significant changes from γ1 = 4 to γ1 = 50, that is a loose banking regulation
does not increase the risk of financial crises (see Figure 2). However, we see that banks do
not always use their maximum possible exposure (reaching very high amounts of risky assets
compared to their net worth), given that this is only a theoretical upper bound. Indeed, in this
paper banks do not allocate their portfolio considering a risk-return optimization, therefore
we can not assess the issue of different banking strategies in presence of different regulatory
rules.
Nevertheless, to better check for the presence of large crises, also in this case we repeat
the Monte Carlo simulations over a “long” time horizon T=500. We compare the case when
γ1 = 50 to the baseline case of γ1 = 10 (see Table 1). With a longer time span, the risk of
financial crises emerges: if γ1 = 50, we count 12 simulations with large crises, versus the 2
simulations of the baseline case. Considering all simulations in which the unemployment rate
exceeds 20% for at least one period, we calculate 15 cases when γ1 = 50 against 3 cases when
γ1 = 10. Excluding the large crisis simulations, the mean unemployment rate is quite low
(9.08% vs 9.73%, statistically different at 1% level), but the possibility to expand the risky
assets volume takes to a higher business cycle volatility (unemployment volatility equal to
2.09% vs 1.84% in the baseline setting; the two average volatilities are statistically different
at 1% level), that can also trigger large crises.
To sum up, an excessively tight constraint on γ1 seems to be more dangerous than an overly
loose one, but also a very high value of γ1 is harmful, given that it increases the possibility of
triggering financial crises.
Comparing these results with those on maximum lending concentration β, we note that
the portfolio composition seems to be more relevant than the overall exposure, even if both
features are very important for banking stability. This statement could support the thesis
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Figure 2: Sensitivity analysis on the impact of the parameter γ1 – from 1 to 50 with step 1 –
on the following variables: (i) unemployment rate, (ii) firms default rate, (iii) banks default
rate, (iv) credit mismatch (that is the difference between the money available from banks and
not lent and the money required by firms and not received). All values are the average on
the 20 simulations with the corresponding γ1 value.
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of many academicians and practitioners that encourage a return from the prudential to the
structural regulation approach (for instance a sort of separation between investment and com-
mercial banking activities). However, the debate about a banking structural reform was more
intense immediately after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, when designated commissions
produced some regulations or proposals: first of all the so called “Volcker Rule” inside the
“DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act” in the US, but also reports
such as the “Vickers Report” for the United Kingdom and the “Liikanen Report” for the
European Union.
4.3 Deregulation case
We analyze the case of a very loose constraint on both parameters, β and γ1, calling it banking
“deregulation” case. In practice, we perform 100 Monte Carlo simulations over the “long”
time horizon (T=500) fixing β = 0.5 and γ1 = 50; in this case banks can lend firms an amount
of money up to 50 times the net worth and they could even give half this amount to a single
firm. This is an overly risky regulation. However, we detect only one simulation with a large
crisis and this is also the only case in which the unemployment rate goes beyond 20%. In the
other 99 simulations, the mean unemployment rate is 9.29% and it never exceeds 20%.
The reason is quite simple: banks make a huge amount of money, they become relatively large
compared to the overall economic size and, in particular, to firms’ size, then they are able to
provide all the required credit without approaching the constraints. For instance, over the 99
simulations without a large crisis, the mean ratio between lent credit and banks’ net worth is
below 4, even if the limit is 50.
But what happens if the large amount of profits, that banks are able to obtain in the de-
regulation case, are used to enrich the payout ratio14 of banks and not to enlarge banks’ net
worth? DeAngelo et al. (2004) and Denis and Osobov (2008) show that most profitable firms
increase their dividends and, more in general, there is ample literature on financialization (for
example, see Stockhammer, 2004) and on corporate governance trend of maximizing share-
holder value (for instance, see Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000, who argue a shift in management
strategies from “retain and invest” to “downsize and distribute” in the USA). Focusing on
banks, in particular, various studies observe an increase of banks payout ratio in the last
decades: Acharya et al. (2011) show the dividend amount for 10 US and 11 European large
banks from 2000 to 2008, while Brogi (2010) exhibits the dividends distributed by Italian
banks; for instance, the Italian banking system distributed 1.4 Euro billions (payout ratio of
27.46%) in 1990, while it distributed 14.4 Euro billions (payout ratio of 64.43%) in 2006, with
an increase of both net profits and payout ratio. Brogi (2010) says: “In the period 2004-2007,
immediately preceding the crisis, the Italian banking system benefited from a considerable
rise in profitability (...), but it did not seize the opportunity to strengthen capital base and, on
the contrary, limited allocations to reserves and opted instead for generous payout policies”.
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Moreover, these authors (but also the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision) highlight
that even when the financial crisis started and the banking system suffered the depletion of
common equity through losses, banks continued to pay dividends. Indeed, banks are reluctant
to reduce dividends, also because high dividend payments signal to the market the soundness
of the bank. Acharya et al. (2011) explain that dividends were paid to equity holders at the
expense of the debt holders (including the taxpayers who fund bailouts) (...) the inertia in
bank accounting makes even a distressed bank appear healthy in terms of its book capital
ratios, enabling a transfer in violation of priority of debt over equity15. Brogi (2010) shows
that from 2001 to 2010 new shares of Italian listed banks totaled about a third of aggregate
dividends paid by the system in the same period, then an early imposition of dividend distri-
bution constraint is an important reform needed by the regulatory system. E.S. Rosengren,
President & Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, expresses a sim-
ilar opinion at “Rethinking Central Banking” Conference held in Washington D.C. in October
2010. This debate makes the Basel Committee introduce the so-called “Capital Conservation
Buffer”, explained in Section 1: if the Common Equity of a bank goes below the 7% threshold,
the bank will have a distribution constraint16. Moreover, in Europe, the Single Supervisory
Mechanism (SSM) gives the supervision on large bank groups to the European Central Bank
(ECB), and the ECB performs a comprehensive assessment (information recruiting, asset
quality review and stress tests), after which it imposes constraints on dividends, issue of new
shares and sale of non-core assets to low capitalized banks.
In light of the reported stylized facts and of the regulatory debate, we modify the para-
meter δ¯b from zero to 0.45. With this value we perform 100 Monte Carlo repetitions two times
with the baseline setting for γ1 and β (γ1 = 10 and β = 0.1) and in the deregulation setting
(γ1 = 50 and β = 0.5). In this way we analyze the case of full “deregulation” in a high payout
ratio environment.
When γ1 = 10 and β = 0.1, as reported in Table 1, the number of large crisis simulations is
equal to 2 as in the baseline case. However, the number of simulations in which the unemploy-
ment rate exceeds 20% increases to 12. This is coherent with the higher mean unemployment
rate (now 11.28%, statistically different at 1% level). It is obviously due to the lower accumu-
lation of bank’s net worth which reduces the credit supply, while it increases financial fragility
(tied to an increased bank leverage).
Instead, now, “deregulation” worsens the economic environment: the number of large crisis
simulation is equal again to 2, but the number of simulations in which the unemployment
rate exceeds 20% is 45, the mean unemployment rate grows to 12.33%, and the mean un-
employment volatility grows to 2.55% (both the unemployment rate and the unemployment
volatility are statistically different at 1% from the baseline scenario values). Deregulation
causes a high business cycle volatility and it implies two features: on one hand it often hap-
pens to reach very high unemployment levels during strong cyclical downturns, on the other
hand regulatory flexibility helps the system not to remain trapped in the large crisis scenario,
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that is, it is easier for the system to recover from large unemployment17.
To conclude: if deregulation is preparatory and associated with a growth of banks’ net
worth, it strengthens the banking sector, making the same rules not binding. Instead, if
deregulation is tied to higher payout and not to a higher net worth, then the leverage and the
credit risk really increase, causing a more fragile economy (higher mean unemployment rate)
and a more volatile business cycle.
Table 1: Summary of Monte Carlo simulations. In each row there is a parameter combination
for which we perform 100 Monte Carlo repetitions on a time span of T=500. We report:
(i) the number of simulations in which the mean unemployment rate is above 20% (N◦ large
crisis), (ii) the number of simulations in which the maximum unemployment rate is above
20% (Max U > 20%), (iii) the mean unemployment rate in the non large crisis simulations
(Mean U %, standard deviation in brackets), (iv) the mean unemployment standard deviation
in the non large crisis simulations (U volatility %, standard deviation in brackets).
N◦ large crisis Max U > 20% Mean U % U volatility %
β = 0.1, γ1 = 10, δ¯b=0 2 3 9.73 (0.87) 1.84 (0.12)
β = 0.5, γ1 = 10, δ¯b=0 22 36 10.61 (2.08) 1.99 (0.31)
β = 0.1, γ1 = 50, δ¯b=0 12 15 9.08 (1.50) 2.09 (0.95)
β = 0.5, γ1 = 50, δ¯b=0 1 1 9.29 (0.13) 2.04 (0.12)
β = 0.1, γ1 = 10, δ¯b=0.45 2 12 11.28 (0.92) 1.96 (0.99)
β = 0.5, γ1 = 50, δ¯b=0.45 2 45 12.33 (3.02) 2.55 (2.08)
5 Concluding remarks
We present an agent-based macroeconomic model that allowed us to investigate the role of
financial regulation on macroeconomic dynamics.
The model is populated by heterogeneous agents (households, firms and banks) that interact
according to a fully decentralized matching mechanism. The matching protocol is common to
all markets (goods, labor, credit, deposits) and represents a best partner choice in a context of
imperfect information. Firms’ financial structure is based on a dynamic target leverage. The
model is useful because it gives rise to emergent macroeconomic properties like the fluctuation
of the unemployment rate, the relevance of leverage cycles and credit constraints on economic
performance, the presence of bank defaults and the role of financial instability, and so on.
In particular, simulations show that endogenous business cycles emerge as a consequence of
the interaction between real and financial factors: when firms’ profits are improving, they
try to expand the production and, if banks extend the required credit, this results in more
employment; the decrease of the unemployment rate leads to the rise of wages which, on the
one hand, increases the aggregate demand, while on the other hand reduces firms’ profits,
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and this may cause the inversion of the business cycle. Moreover, model simulations highlight
that even extended crises can endogenously emerge with a strong reduction of real wages, a
consequent fall of the aggregate demand that, in turn, induces firms to decrease production,
so enlarging the unemployment rate, in a vicious positive feedback circle. In these cases, the
system may remain trapped, without the possibility of spontaneously recovering unless an
exogenous intervention occurs.
This modeling framework is useful to understand the effects of certain policy or institu-
tional changes. In this paper we perform some computational experiments on the role of
the parameter governing banks’ capital regulation and credit portfolio concentration. The
first constraint is related to the First Pillar of Basel III Capital regulation, while the credit
concentration is tied to the Second Pillar.
The analysis shows that:
• if banking regulation is excessively tight then strong credit constraints emerge, deteri-
orating economic and financial conditions;
• if regulatory rules are overly loose, then an excessive financial risk follows and this may
result in bankruptcy avalanches of both firms and banks and large unemployment. This
is strongly relevant when regulation allows for high risk concentration;
• portfolio composition seems to be more relevant than the overall exposure, even if both
features are very important for banking stability;
• if “deregulation” is associated with a growth of banks’ net worth, it strengthens the
banking sector, making the regulatory constraints not binding. However, this result is
tied to a banks’ profit reinvestment in net worth larger than that observed during the
last 20 years, when banks did not retain the huge amount of profit made and then took
all the possible risk amount allowed;
• if deregulation is tied to higher payout and not to a higher net worth, then the leverage
and the credit risk really increase, causing a more fragile economy (higher mean unem-
ployment rate and a more volatile business cycle). This supports the introduction of
the Basel III Capital Conservation Buffer.
Moreover, our policy experiments also give some interesting and more general results:
• we find non-linear relationships between the health of the economy (proxied by the
unemployment rate) and the parameter values;
• the interaction of regulatory rules could give rise to complex outputs producing un-
expected results, such as the good performance of the economy when deregulation is
associated with “low” dividends;
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• implications are strictly related with other behavioral assumptions of the model (for
instance the already mentioned willingness to distribute profits);
• to determine the “right” intervention, policy makers should not underestimate these
complexities.
To further develop the analysis we will work on a large research agenda:
• work on other policy experiments (for instance on fiscal and monetary policies);
• test the consequences of alternative assumptions, such as labor market rigidity, hetero-
geneous consumption/saving behavior, etc.;
• refine the model with a varying number of actors (firms and banks) during the business
cycle and a diversity of decisional timings (and frequency) in the different markets;
• extend the model by introducing new markets, for instance the stock and bond markets,
the interbank market, and a market for investment goods;
• extend the model with long-run growth factors (heterogeneous workers’skills, R&D in-
vestments, etc.);
Obviously, these items are strictly related. When we will extend the model, we will also
be able to test for further alternative assumptions and different parameter settings (based
on an empirical calibration of the the model), and then we will assess more detailed policy
experiments. For instance, the presence of investment goods is strictly related to techno-
logical progress underlying economic growth, or the presence of stock, bond and interbank
markets will allow us to investigate the impact of agents’ portfolio allocation based on a more
complicated behavior for financial choices.
24
Notes
1In general terms, the dynamics of any contagion process crucially depends on network topology. In this
context, heterogeneity becomes of paramount importance: some nodes may be too big or too connected to
fail. Since Allen and Gale (2000), a relevant literature strand contributes to analyze how some topological
aspects can reduce contagion and systemic risk. For instance, Allen and Gale (2000) highlight the benefits
of increasing diversification, suggesting that a more connected network is better for financial stability, while
later works (such as Gai and Kapadia, 2010, or Battiston et al., 2012) have challenged this view, showing
that diversification is not always beneficial for stability, and underlining instead the systemic risk caused by
default cascades and other contagion effects
2For a comprehensive description of a large-scale agent-based macroeconomic model, including a detailed
explanation of the initialization phase within a stock-flow consistent structure, see the Eurace@Unibi User
Guide by Dawid et al. (2011).
3This capital structure is also investigated in the agent-based model proposed by Riccetti et al. (2013a).
4Ashraf et al. (2014) analyze the impact of the trend rate of inflation on macroeconomic performance.
5This paper is included in a book edited by Gaffard and Napoletano (2012) in which there are many
contributions on agent-based models and economic policy.
6For a different view on the role of bank capital requirements in reducing credit availability, see Admati
and Hellwig (2013a,b).
7Other authors point out various related issues: for instance, Broner and Ventura (2013) show that financial
liberalization might lead to different outcomes from “large capital inflows and higher investment and growth”
to “volatile capital flows and unstable domestic financial markets” or to “domestic capital flight”; instead,
Moral-Benito and Roehn (2014) evidence the relationship between two of the potential causes of the crisis,
that is global imbalances and financial market deregulation, showing that financial market regulations affect
current account balances and that different aspects of these regulations can have opposing effects on the
current account).
8There is ample literature on this topic from academicians, policy makers and practitioners, which has led
to lively debates and interesting conferences. Just to make an example, see the BIS Paper Number 60 entitled
“Macroprudential regulation and policy”, which is the proceedings of a joint conference organized by the BIS
and the Bank of Korea in Seoul on 17-18 January 2011.
9A numerical example can clarify the meaning of these rules: suppose bank 1 to have equity A1 = 10,
deposits D1 = 30 and money from the central bank M1 = 20. Using the baseline setting of the parameters,
that is γ1 = 10 and γ2 = 0.5, the bank presents kˆ1 = 10 ∗ 10 = 100, but it cannot lend 100 to firms because it
has only k¯1 = 0.5 ∗ 10 + 30 + 20 = 55, therefore the maximum amount that can be lent is 55. Instead, suppose
bank 2 to have equity A2 = 10, deposits D2 = 100 and money from the central bank M2 = 20. In this case bank
2 presents kˆ2 = 10∗10 = 100, and it can lend all the 100 to firms because it has k¯2 = 0.5∗10+100+20 = 125.
10The mechanism is similar to “liquidity injections” implemented in de Walque et al. (2010). Although we
keep unchanged the interest rate while the quantity of money varies to adjust the credit mismatch between
firms and banks, the reported results are not strictly dependent on this assumption. Indeed, we also perform
some computational experiments involving two types of Taylor rules for interest rate setting: the first one
resembling the working of the Fed (equal weight for inflation and output gap) and the second one similar to
the ECB behavior (only inflation targeting). For a detailed discussion, see Riccetti et al. (2013b).
11This parameter does not exactly correspond either to the 4.5% minimum capital requirement or to the
3% Leverage Ratio rule, because we consider that the risk comes only from the credit extended to firms, thus
implying that risk-free government bonds have a risk-weighting equal to zero (because the Central Bank is
committed to buying the unsold government bonds, without a spread over the policy rate).
12In a sense, given that we set 80 firms in our computational experiments, each entity can approximately
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represent one of the 99 “divisions” of the ISIC rev.4 (International Standard Industrial Classification of All
Economic Activities) or the 70 “industries” of the GICS (Global Industry Classification Standard). For
instance if β = 0.1, this implies that each bank can have a maximum exposition towards each “division” equal
to 10% of the total supply of credit.
13Given the quite high number of simulations involved in this sensitivity analysis, we avoid to perform a
larger number of repetitions that would be useful to smooth the patterns shown in the figure. In spite of the
spikes in the plots, we think that the tendencies of the four variables are understandable.
14Here we proxy the payout ratio with the percentage of dividends paid on profits, even if now repurchases
are the dominant form of payout (see Brav et al., 2005, or Skinner, 2008).
15Admati and Hellwig (2013b), facing the market discipline problem, also point out the conflicts of interest
between debt and equity holders: “The extensive use of debt in banking actually creates significant conflicts
of interest between bank managers and bank shareholders on the one hand, and creditors or taxpayers on the
other”.
16This regulatory debate goes with the debate on the proper notion of regulatory capital, see for instance
Acharya et al. (2011). Indeed, the Tier 2 notion used by the Basel II agreement, that is, a buffer against
depositors loss then including hybrid claims such as preferred equity or subordinated debt, makes the com-
position of bank capital change from equity to hybrid claims, increasing banking leverage relative to common
equity. Moreover, the injections of bank capital from Governments, for instance through the TARP program
in the United States, often took the form of preferred equity rather than common equity, further increasing
leverage and not reducing the reluctance of banks to extend credit.
17For this reason, the idea of a countercyclical regulation, tighter during the expansionary phases and
looser during recessions, such as the Basel III “Countercyclical Buffer” (that is, authorities can ask up to an
additional 2.5% of common equity when credit grows too much), could be an important tool.
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APPENDIX A: Sequence of events
The sequence of events occurring in each period of time runs as follows:
1. At first firms ask for credit to banks given the demand deriving from their net worth
and leverage target. In each period, the leverage level changes according to expected
profits and inventories.
2. Banks set their credit supply depending on their net worth, deposits and the quantity of
money provided by the central bank. Moreover, they must comply with some regulatory
constraints.
3. Banks and firms interact in the credit market. At the end of the matching process,
some banks may lend all the available credit supply while others may remain with some
residual money; similarly, some firms may obtain the required credit while other may
remain credit constrained.
4. The government hires public workers.
5. Firms hire workers in the labor market. The labor demand depends on available funds,
that is net worth and bank credit. After the labor matching some firms satisfy their
labor demand, while others remain with residual cash; at the same time, some people
may remain unemployed. Employed people pay income taxes to the government.
6. Firms produce consumption goods on the basis of hired workers. They put in the goods
market their current period production and previous period inventories.
7. Individuals decide their desired consumption on the basis of their wages and wealth (net
of taxes).
8. Individuals and firms interact in the goods market. As a result, some households satisfy
their desired consumption, while others may remain with residual cash; on the other
hand, some firms sell all the produced output, while others may accumulate inventories.
9. Individuals determine their savings (that is, programmed saving plus residual cash) to
be deposited in banks.
10. Firms calculate profits and survival firms repay their debt to banks, pay taxes, and
distribute dividends to households.
11. Banks calculate profits. Individuals lose (part of) deposited money in case of bank
defaults. Survival banks pay taxes and distribute dividends to households.
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12. The government collects taxes and, given the wage expenditure for public workers and
the interest on outstanding public debt, calculates its deficit (surplus), and updates the
overall debt.
13. Banks buy government securities to employ excess liquidity. The central bank purchases
the remaining securities.
14. Agents update their wealth, on which they pay capital levy.
15. Central bank decides the amount of money to be lent to banks in the following period
according to credit demand/supply unbalance.
16. New entrants replace bankrupted agents (firms or banks with negative net worth) ac-
cording to a one-to-one replacement. The money needed to finance new entrants is
subtracted from households’ wealth. In the case private wealth is not enough, then
government intervenes. Therefore, the model is stock flow consistent given that we do
not create new financial resources when new entrants substitute defaulted agents.
The simulation code of the agent-based model, written in the R-project software, is avail-
able as an on-line appendix to the present paper.
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APPENDIX B: Details on behavioral rules
In this appendix we provide additional details on the agents’ behavioral rules that we
avoided to insert in the main text in order to have a concise discussion. For the sake of
clarity, we follow the same order as in the main text, that is we present behavioral rules
regarding the action of agents in the following markets: credit, labor, goods, and deposits.
Credit market. The leverage target is set according to the following rule:
lft =
8
>>><
>>>:
lft−1 · (1 + α · U(0, 1)) , if pift−1/(Aft−1 +Bft−1) > ift−1 and yˆft−1 < ψ · yft−1
lft−1, if pift−1/(Aft−1 +Bft−1) = ift−1 and yˆft−1 < ψ · yft−1
lft−1 · (1− α · U(0, 1)) , if pift−1/(Aft−1 +Bft−1) < ift−1 or yˆft−1 ≥ ψ · yft−1
(10)
where α > 0 is a parameter representing the maximum percentage change of the relevant
variable (in this case the target leverage), U(0, 1) is a random number picked from a uniform
distribution in the interval (0,1), pift−1 is the gross profit (realized in the previous period),
Aft−1 + Bft−1 is the previous period total capital (net worth Aft−1 plus debt Bft−1), ift−1
is the nominal interest rate paid on previous debts,18 yˆft−1 represents inventories (that is,
unsold goods), 0 ≤ ψ ≤ 1 is a parameter representing a threshold for inventories based on
previous period production yft−1.
The bank-specific component of the interest rate charged on loans to firms evolves as follows:
iˆbt =
8
<
:
iˆbt−1 · (1− α · U(0, 1)) , if Bˆbt−1 > 0
iˆbt−1 · (1 + α · U(0, 1)) , if Bˆbt−1 = 0
(11)
where Bˆbt−1 is the amount of money that the bank did not manage to lend to firms in the
previous period.
Labor market. In each period, workers post a wage wit which is updated according to the
following rule:
wit =
8
<
:
wit−1 · (1 + α · U(0, 1)) , if i employed at time t− 1
wit−1 · (1− α · U(0, 1)) , if i unemployed at time t− 1
(12)
However, the required wage has a minimum tied to the price of a single good.
Goods market. Households set their desired consumption as follows:
cdit = c1 · wit + c2 · Ait (13)
where 0 < c1 ≤ 1 is the propensity to consume current income, 0 ≤ c2 ≤ 1 is the propensity
to consume the wealth Ait. If the amount c
d
it is smaller than the average price of one good p¯
then cdit = min(p¯ , wit + Ait).
37
Firms set the selling price according to this rule:
pft =
8
<
:
pft−1 · (1 + α · U(0, 1)) , if yˆft−1 = 0 and yft−1 > 0
pft−1 · (1− α · U(0, 1)) , if yˆft−1 > 0 or yft−1 = 0
(14)
However, the minimum level of the price is given by the average cost of production.
Deposit market. Banks offer an interest rate on deposits according to their funds require-
ment:
iDbt =
8
<
:
iDbt−1 · (1− α · U(0, 1)) , if k¯bt −Bbt − Γbt > 0
min{iDbt−1 · (1 + α · U(0, 1)) , iCBt}, if k¯bt −Bbt − Γbt = 0
(15)
where Γbt is the amount of public debt bought by bank b at time t.
Households set the minimum interest rate they want to obtain on bank deposits as follows:
iDit =
8
<
:
iDit−1 · (1− α · U(0, 1)) , if Dit−1 = 0
iDit−1 · (1 + α · U(0, 1)) , if Dit−1 > 0
(16)
where Dit−1 is the individual i’s deposit in the previous period.
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APPENDIX C: Parameter space and quasi-steady-state
Table 2 reports the value of parameters we used to simulate the model. Model simulations
are not calibrated against empirical data. We do not perform any validation exercise, but just
analyze the qualitative behavior of the model both in the baseline scenario and for different
configurations of regulatory parameters. However, for the chosen parameter setting, the model
exhibits a statistical equilibrium around a quasi-steady-state. Moreover, multiple simulations
and sensitivity analyses, as those proposed in the present paper to explore the effects of
changing regulatory parameters, show that the model is quite robust to alternative parameter
settings. In order to describe the statistical properties of the quasi-steady-state, we report
the average and standard deviation of the main macroeconomic variables in Table 3. In
particular, simulation data are collected from 1000 runs of the same model (only changing
the sequence of random numbers): in 995 simulations, the model exhibits a “regular behavior”,
that is the economy presents business cycle fluctuations, that does not exclude the presence of
endogenous crises; however, only in 5 out of 1000 runs, an “extended crisis” scenario emerges,
that is the economy may enter a long depression, recovering only in the very long run (in 3
out of 5 cases) or give rise to a complete crash of the private sector without recovery at all
(in the remaining 2 cases).
Accordingly, we are able to reproduce the endogenous evolution of both small and large crises
within the same agent-based macroeconomic framework. There are pros and cons of such
a result. On the one hand, we are able to describe a variety of macroeconomic scenarios,
including extended crises, without changing the parameter setting nor the agents’ behavioral
rules and/or the interaction mechanisms; in this way, we do not introduce ad hoc assumptions
to obtain such results; moreover, the agents try to adapt to a changing environment according
to their simple rules of behavior based on heterogeneous variables (e.g., a worker decreases
her requested wage if unemployed, and vice versa). On the other hand, we assume that
agents’ behavioral rules are fixed, that is they are time-invariant, meaning that agents behave
according to the same rules and the same parameters (for instance, during a boom or in a large
crisis). Therefore, a possible extension of our model could consider that agents choose the
rules to follow depending on the characteristics of the environment in which they are operating
(e.g. an unemployed worker decreases her requested wage, not only taking into account her
own occupational status as in Equation 12, but considering the overall level of unemployment
rate as well) or that they can switch from one rule to another (e.g. from risk-prone to
risk-averse behavior for an agent passing from a booming phase to a following recession)
based on some performance indicator (e.g. expected profit). Moreover, different degrees of
rationality embedded in agents’ learning processes can be introduced, thus allowing to study
the relationship between agents’ rationality and macroeconomic performance, in particular
when heterogeneous degrees of rationality are considered in the population of agents (see, for
instance, Sinitskaya and Tesfatsion, 2015, in which they show that (i) simple rules of behavior
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Table 2: Parameter setting
H number of individuals 500
F number of firms 80
B number of banks 10
α adjustment parameter 0.05
χ matching imperfect information 0.2
ψ inventory threshold 0.1
γ1 max bank’s leverage 10
γ2 max % of bank’s capital invested in lending 0.5
β max bank’s lending to single firm 0.1
ρ risk premium on firm’s loan 2
c1 propensity to consume current income 0.8
c2 propensity to consume wealth 0.3
φ firm’s productivity 3
τ tax rate on income 0.3
τ ′ tax rate on wealth 0.05
τ¯ ′ threshold for tax on wealth 3
g % of public workers on population 0.33
iCB central bank policy rate 0.01
can outperform more complicated rules as “adaptive dynamic programming”, and that (ii)
memory length allowing for some degree of adaptation is key for good performance). These
are topics which are worth to be investigated. We may provide our contribution by extending
the current framework along these lines in the next future.
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Table 3: Average values and standard deviations (computed over the time span 101-150) from
995 simulations of the baseline model with mean unemployment rate below 20%.
Variable Mean St. Dev.
Unemployment rate 9.92% 1.63%
Unemployment volatility 2.05% 0.48%
Firm default rate 6.45% 2.10%
Bank default rate 0.57% 0.57%
Wage share 63.4% 0.53%
Public deficit 3.26% 0.19%
Interest rate 9.11% 1.93%
Inflation rate 1.99% 0.07%
Firm mean leverage 1.65 0.24
Bank mean exposure 3.27 1.30
APPENDIX D: Additional results from the sensitivity analysis
In this appendix we provide a table in which the results of a Monte Carlo simulation
including different combinations of regulatory parameters, already analyzed in Table 1 only
regarding the unemployment rate, are presented. The average values across Monte Carlo
simulations are reported in Table 4. We also include Table 5, in which the median values of
multiple simulations are reported, to assess the robustness of our findings.
Table 4: Summary of Monte Carlo simulations. In each column there is a parameter com-
bination for which we perform 100 Monte Carlo repetitions on a time span of T=500. As in
Table 1 we report the results for the simulations without large crises. Standard deviations
are in brackets.
β = 0.1 β = 0.5 β = 0.1 β = 0.5 β = 0.1 β = 0.5
γ1 = 10 γ1 = 10 γ1 = 50 γ1 = 50 γ1 = 10 γ1 = 50
δ¯b=0 δ¯b=0 δ¯b=0 δ¯b=0 δ¯b=0.45 δ¯b=0.45
Public deficit % 3.16 (0.05) 3.17 (0.15) 3.16 (0.26) 3.13 (0.01) 3.26 (0.13) 3.33 (0.54)
Interest rate % 8.04 (0.81) 9.05 (5.76) 7.43 (0.69) 7.79 (0.21) 10.06 (0.99) 10.81 (4.27)
Inflation rate % 1.99 (0.04) 1.94 (0.10) 2.02 (0.07) 2.01 (0.01) 1.91 (0.05) 1.88 (0.15)
Firm default rate % 6.21 (0.70) 7.96 (5.49) 6.12 (4.59) 5.88 (0.29) 8.57 (7.72) 9.14 (7.27)
Bank default rate % 0.40 (0.38) 2.28 (4.60) 0.60 (1.10) 0.62 (0.21) 1.29 (1.46) 6.52 (4.67)
Firm leverage 1.26 (0.31) 1.02 (0.32) 1.55 (0.33) 1.40 (0.10) 0.59 (0.13) 0.53 (0.22)
Bank exposure 3.14 (0.61) 3.50 (1.48) 4.73 (3.64) 3.74 (0.26) 4.89 (0.93) 12.89 (9.26)
Corr(unemp.-firm leverage) % -6.37 -3.19 -22.44 -23.55 -36.26 -28.82
Corr(unemp.-bank exposure) % -47.36 -44.49 -41.91 -47.11 -20.74 -2.56
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Table 5: Summary of Monte Carlo simulations. In each column there is a parameter combina-
tion for which we perform 100 Monte Carlo repetitions on a time span of T=500. As in Table
1 we report the results for the simulations without large crises: we compute the mean of the
analyzed variables for each simulation and then we report the median across simulations.
β = 0.1 β = 0.5 β = 0.1 β = 0.5 β = 0.1 β = 0.5
γ1 = 10 γ1 = 10 γ1 = 50 γ1 = 50 γ1 = 10 γ1 = 50
δ¯b=0 δ¯b=0 δ¯b=0 δ¯b=0 δ¯b=0.45 δ¯b=0.45
Mean U % 9.40 9.93 8.66 9.27 11.07 11.03
U volatility % 1.83 2.00 1.94 2.05 1.68 1.96
Public deficit % 3.14 3.15 3.11 3.13 3.23 3.19
Interest rate % 7.75 8.31 7.27 7.78 10.06 13.40
Inflation rate % 2.01 1.98 2.04 2.01 1.92 1.92
Firm default rate % 6.07 6.42 5.38 5.88 5.80 6.57
Bank default rate % 0.22 0.99 0.30 0.60 0.69 4.22
Firm leverage 1.32 1.12 1.64 1.40 0.60 0.59
Bank exposure 3.24 3.24 4.27 3.73 4.60 10.40
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